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Comment
Daniel C. Turack*

Identifying a Future Refugee
Problem: Hong Kong, 1997

On December 19, 1984, the United Kingdom's Prime Minister, Margaret
Thatcher, and Premier Zhao Ziyang of the People's Republic of China,
formally signed the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of
Hong Kong' whereby the status of the British Dependent Territory of
Hong Kong will cease to exist. As of July 1, 1997, the Chinese Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) will resume or be restored
to sovereignty 2 over the total territory known as Hong Kong.,

*Professor of Law, Capital University Law School
1. 1984 Great Britain, Treaty Series No. 20 (Cmnd. 9352); this treaty has been reprinted under the
title "A Draft Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of The People's Republic of China on the Future of Hong
Kong," 23 Int'l Leg. Mat. 1366 (1984) [hereinafter referred to and cited as "Joint Declaration" with
page references to the latter citation]. The international agreement comprises The Joint Declaration,
Annex I"Elaboration by ThePeople's Republic of China of its BasicPolicies regarding Hong Kong,"
Annex II "Sino-British Joint Liaison Group," Annex II "Land Leases." Ratifications were exchanged on May 27, 1985. The Joint Declaration entered into force on May 27, and as a treaty it was
registered with the United Nations on June 13, 1985, pursuant to article 102 of the UN Charter. There
is also an Exchange of Memoranda between the two governments in Peking on the day of signing
the Joint Declaration, ibid. 1381.
2. The territory of Hong Kong comprises Hong Kong, The Lan Tau Islands, the Kowloon Peninsula
and more than 200 smaller islands. United Kingdom authority over the territory was attained via the
1842 Treaty of Nanking, (Treaty of Nanking, August 29, 1842, China-Great Britain, 30 Brit. & For.
St. Pap. 389), the 1860 Treaty of Peking (Convention of Peking, October 24, 1860, China-Great
Britain, 50 Brit. & For. St. Pap. 17).
It has been the PRC's position that the Chinese territories in the 1842 and 1860 Treaties were never
ceded dejure to United Kingdom sovereignty and that all three Treaties relating to Hong Kong were
"unequal treaties" imposed illegally, see P. Wesley-Smith, Unequal Treaty 1898-1997: China,
GreatBritainandHong Kong'sNew Territories(1980), at (62-63; 167-68,185-87); Hungdah Chiu,
People'sRepublicofChinaAnd The Law Of Treaties60-71 (1972); W.L. Tung, China And Foreign
Powers: The Impact OfAndReaction To Unequal Treaties(1970). An in depth legal-analysis of the
issues with respect to inequality concerning The Treaty of Nanking is found in Greenberg, "Hong
Kong's Future: Can thePeople'sRepublic of ChinaInvaiidateThe Treaty ofNanking As AnUnequal
Treaty?," (1984), 7 Fordharn Int'l L. J. 534. In furtherance of its position, the PRC requested and was
granted the removal of Hong Kong from the list of colonial territories issued by the United Nations
in the Declaration and the Granting ofIndependence to Colonial Territories and Peoples; see the letter
of March 10, 1972, from the Chinese delegate, Huang Hu, to the UN Committee on Decolonization,
reprinted in J. Cohen & H. Chiu, eds., People'sChinaAndInternationalLaw:ADocumentaryStudy,
(1974), at 384 [here after cited as Cohen].
On the conflicting notions of sovereignty held by the British and Chinese of the PRC see Mushkat,
"The Transition from British to Chinese Rule in Hong Kong: A Discussion of Salient International
Legal Issues," (1986), 14 Den. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 171, at 174-178.
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In the Joint Declaration, the PRC declared that in accordance with
Article 311 of the PRC Constitution on resumption of its sovereignty, a
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) would operate and
retain 'a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defense affairs'
4
which would be the responsibilities of the Central People's Government.
The essential characteristic of the agreement 'is based on the theory of
"one country, two systems"5 that will preserve Hong Kong's current
social and economic systems for fifty years instead of the PRC's socialist
system and socialist policies. A Hong Kong SAR framework is set-out in
the Joint Declaration for autonomy to be implemented through enactment
6
of a Basic Law forHong Kong by the PRC's National People's Congress.
The Basic Law will serve as the supreme legal instrument operative in the
autonomous Hong Kong SAR for validating local legislation and the
entity's institutions.
"Rights and freedoms including those of the person, of speech, of the
press, of assembly, of association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research and of
religious belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong SAR,"7 while
its Government shall protect the rights and freedoms of "inhabitants and
other persons" in the Region according to the law.8 According to the
explanatory notes attached to the agreement, the Parties do not intend the
listing of the various freedoms and rights to be exhaustive. 9 Interestingly,
although the PRC is not a party to either the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights or the International Covenant on Economic,

3. Article 31 provides: "The state may establish special administrative regions when necessary. The
systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by the
National People's Congress in light of the specific conditions." People's Republic of China
Constitution (1980).
4. Joint Declaration, para. 3. (1) and (2) atp. 1371.
5. On the "one country, two systems" concept see Yan Ziaqui, "Concept Points to Reunification",
(April 1985), 14 Beijing Rev. 22 at 22-23, cited by Mushkat, supra,note 2. at 180. See also Zhang
Youyu, "The Reasons for and Basic Principles in Formulating The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Basic Law, And Its Essential Contents and Mode of Expression," (1988), 2 J. Chinese
Law 5 at 6; Bundy, "The Reunification of China With Hong Kong And Its Implications For Taiwan:
An Analysis of the One Country, Two Systems Model," (1987), 19 Cal. W. Int'l L. J. 271, at 284286 (1987); Chang, "Towards aJurisprudence ofaThird Kind-One Country,Two Systems" (1988),
20 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 99.
6. Annex I, par. I at p. 1373.
7. Joint Declaration, para. 3 (5).
8. Annex I, XIII. It furtherstates thatthe Region Government "shall maintain the rights and freedoms
as provided for by the laws previously in force in Hong Kong, including freedom of the person, of
speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, to form and join trade unions, of correspondence,
of travel, of movement, of strike, of demonstration, of choice of occupation, of academic research,
of belief, inviolability of the home, the freedom to marly and the right to raise a family freely."
9. ExplanatoryNotes [to the Joint Declaration], Section XIII at p. 1385.
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Social and Cultural Rights, both of these treaties are to remain in force in
the Hong Kong SAR.'0 Maintenance of public order is within the
responsibility of the Hong Kong SAR Government. However, the presence of the Central People's Government military forces stationed in the
Region for defense purposes and not to interfere in the Region's internal
affairs" raises the question of whether the central government can
intervene if it concludes that the Region's authorities can no longer
control public order.
Because the Hong Kong residents played no role in the negotiations 2
leading up to the Joint Declaration, or the legal structure to determine
their future, and the adopted process gave them a limited role subject to
the final decision in Beijing, the Joint Declaration's coverage of travel
documents, permanent identity cards, nationality, right of abode and
immigration carries great significance.
Freedom of Movement
Amongst the enumerated rights in the Joint Declaration, article XIV in
Annex I contains provisions on lawful residence and freedom of movement to take effect when the Hong Kong SAR is established. These tenets
specify who will be considered residents 3 of the territory, and eligibility
to obtain permanent identity cards to that effect. Those who will have the
right of abode are: (1) all Chinese nationals born in or who have resided
in Hong Kong continuously for at least seven years before or after the
SAR is established; (2) Chinese nationals born outside of Hong Kong of
persons in (1); (3) all other persons who have resided continuously in
10. Annex I, XII. A number of important queries arise in respect of the PRC's obligations to these
treaties to which it is not party, and whether the United Kingdom's reservations as applied to Hong
Kong continue; see H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination (1990), at 144.
The United Kingdom made reservations relating to immigration and to the deportation of aliens,
which will be discussed subsequently. Of relevance to treaty practice of the Parties see Goldstein,
"Chinese and Western Treaty Practice: An Application To The Joint Declaration Between The
People's Republic Of China And Great Britain Concerning The Question of Hong Kong" (1986), 1
Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 167. Mushkat, supra note 2 at 189-194.
With respect to the PRC's regard for, and practices involving human rights prior to the June 4, 1989,
massacre in Beijing, see J.F. Copper, F. Michael and Yan-li Wu,Human Rights In Post-MAO China
(1985), and R. R. Edwards, L. Henkin & A. J. Nathan, HumanRights in ContemporaryChina (1986).
11. Annex I, XII.
12. See, 23 Int'lLeg. Mat. 1367-1369; Hungdah Chiu, Y.C. Jao & Yuan-li Wu, eds., The Future of
Hong Kong (1987). at 197-203. On background to the Joint Declaration also see Wesley-Smith,
Settlement of the Question of Hong Kong (1987), 17 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 116; Karamanian, "Legal
Aspects of the Sino-British Draft Agreement on the Future of Hong Kong" (1985), 20 Tex. Int'l L.
J. 167 at pp. 167-170; Marston, "United Kingdom Materials On International Law 1989," (1989), 60
Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 569, 595-598 (1989),
13. As to who will be considered residents and non-residents ofthe Hong Kong SAR, and theirrights
and freedoms, see Wang Shuwen, The Basic Rights and Obligations of Residents of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (1988), 2 J. Chinese L. 123.
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Hong Kong as their permanent residence for at least seven years before
or after the SAR is established; (4) children under 21, born of persons
abovementioned; (5) other persons who had the right to reside only in
Hong Kong before the establishment of the SAR.
It is further stipulated that Government of the Hong Kong SAR "may
on its own issue travel documents for entry into and exit from Hong
Kong.""4 Moreover, the permanent identity cardholders who are Chinese
nationals will be entitled to be issued the Region's passports and travel
documents as well as to the other lawful residents. These passports and
travel documents will be valid for all States and other parts of the PRC and
will carry a statement of the bearer's right to return to the Region. Annex
I, article XIV, further elaborates that residents of the Region may use
travel documents either issued by the Region's Government, the PRC or
other states, for entry into and exit from the Region, while the Region's
holder s of permanent identity cards may have the right of abode inscribed
in their travel document. Entry into the Hong Kong SAR by persons from
other parts of China continues to be subject to current practice. Finally,
the Region's Government has authority to regulate immigration control
over persons from foreign states who seek exit or ingress or stay in the
Region.15 From these provisions, it is possible that non-Chinese residents
and British citizens could be denied the Region's permanent identity
card, and as foreigners, be subject to the vicissitudes of immigration
controls.
The Chinese and United Kingdom Exchange of Memoranda concerns
both travel documents and nationality, and has an impact on the status of
persons after June 30, 1997, especially those who were designated as
British Dependent Territories Citizens (BDTC's) at the time of the
agreement. Whatever the status of these memoranda 6 their impact on
thousands, if not millions of persons, in Hong Kong, can potentially
create formidable refugee problems. It is not my intention to review all
the complexities of the United Kingdom and Chinese nationality principles as they pertain to the Joint Declaration and Memoranda, and their
various ramifications upon the movement of persons, as the subject of

14. Joint Declaration, supra,note 1, par. 10.
15. Provision is also made for the PRC to assist or authorize the Region's Government to conclude
visa abolition agreements.
16. The introduction to the Joint Declaration states "[a]ssociated with the agreement is a separate
Exchange of Memoranda" supra,note 1, para. 25, atp. 1370. Some commentators question whether
the memoranda are internationally binding on the Parties: see Mushkat, supra,note 2 at p. 202, n.
169.
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nationality has already spawned considerable comment.' 7 However,
some nationality principles must be reviewed to demonstrate what may
18
well occur in the future.
The Chinese Memorandum indicates that under its Nationality Law of
1980, "all Hong Kong Chinese compatriots whether they are holders of
the British Dependent Territories citizens' Passport' or not, are Chinese
nationals."' 9 Reference to "compatriots" encompasses those of Chinese
ethnicity who live on Chinese sovereign territory and is meant-to
distinguish these persons from overseas Chinese who reside in foreign
territory.2 0 The PRC Memorandum takes into account "the historical
background of Hong Kong and its realities" and provides that PRC
authorities "will, with effect from 1 July 1997, permit Chinese nationals
in Hong Kong who were previously called 'British Dependent Territories
citizens' to use travel documents issued by the Government of the United
Kingdom for the purpose of travelling to other states and regions."
However, these persons will not be entitled to British consular protection
in the Hong Kong SAR or in the PRC. 1
Four underlying principles permeate the 1980 PRC Nationality Law:
(1) unity, that is a single class of nationality, (2) a combination of thejus
sanguinis (conferment of nationality based on blood-relation-descent)
17. See in particular: Chua, "The Sino-British Agreement And Nationality: Hong Kong's Future In
The Hands Of The People's Republic Of China" (1990), 8 U.C.L.A. Pac. Basin L. J. 163; White,
"Nationality Aspects Of The Hong Kong Settlement" (1988), 20 CaseW. Res. J. Int'l L. 225; Parlin,
"The Nationality Crisis of Hong Kong's Non-Chinese Residents - Scholarly Myth Or Harsh
Reality" (1986), 12 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 369; Mushkat, supra,note 2 atpp. 198-205; Mushkat, "The
International Legal Status Of Hong Kong Under Post-Transitional Rule" (1997), 10 Houston J.Int'l
L. 1,at 16-20; Castle, "The Reversion Of Hong Kong To China: Legal And Practical Questions"
(1985), 21 Willamette L. Rev. 327 at 340-346 (1985); Karamanian, supra,note 12 at 179-181.
An excellent historical review of rationality questions in respect of Hong Kong was accomplished
by White, "Hong Kong Nationality and The British Empire: Historical Doubts and Confusions on the
Status of the Inhabitants" (1989), 19 Hong Kong L. J. 10.
18. International law accords states a considerable latitude in determining who will be considered
their nationals. State decisions in this regard directly affect whether the state's prerogative of
conferring nationality has gone too far vis-a-vis other members of the international community in
international law's regulation of nationality; see generally R. Donner, The RegulationOfNationality
InInternationalLaw(1983); H. F. Van Panhuys,TheRoleofNationalityinlnternationalLaw
(1959);
Brownlie, "The Relations Of Nationality In Public International Law" (1963), 39 British Y.B. Int'l
L. 284.
19. The Chinese Memorandum is found in (1984), 23 Int'l Leg. Mat. 1381. For acommentary on the
Chinese Nationality Law see Ginsburgs, "The 1990 Nationality Law of The People's Republic of
China" (1982), 30 Am.J. Comp. L. 459. On the wider implications of the application of the Chinese
nationality law seeTung-Pi Chen, "The Nationality Law Of ThePeople's Republic Of China And The
Overseas Chinese In Hong Kong, Macao And Southeast Asia"(1984), 5 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int'l & Comp.
L. 281.
20. The Chinese Memorandum, supra,note 19 at 1381.
21. Ibid.

Identifying a Future Refugee Problem: Hong Kong, 1997

andjus soli (conferment based on physical place of birth), (3) equality of
the sexes, and (4) non-recognition of dual nationality.2 With respect to
conferment of nationality, the combination of the jus soli and the jus
sanguinis deprives Chinese nationality to a child born overseas to
Chinese parents settled overseas if the child, at birth, acquires foreign
nationality? 3 Article 3 proclaims that the PRC refuses "to recognize dual
nationality for any Chinese national" and to that end elaborate measures
are found in the Nationality Law.24 Tangentially, the stateless and aliens
may become naturalized Chinese nationals if they are "willing to abide
by China's constitution" provided that the have close relatives in the
PRC, are settled there, or have "other legitimate reasons," z and, children
born in the PRC of persons who are stateless or of uncertain nationality
and settled in China are Chinese nationals.2 6
Before looking at the United Kingdom Memorandum, some preliminary attention must be given to changes of status brought about by the
British Nationality Act 1981.27 As one commentator stated "[tlhe immigration legislation on which the Act is founded is racially discriminatory
in effect if not in intent."28 The Act was to make clear who had the right
of unrestricted entry and abode in the United Kingdom. Three categories
of citizenship are created under the Act. First, British citizenship and right
of abode in the United Kingdom is reserved for those individuals whose
"genuine and effective links"29 lie with the United Kingdom as determinedprimarily by existing immigration law. Second, British Dependent
Territories Citizenship (B.D.T.C.) is given to those individuals whose

22. Tung-Pi Chen, supra,note 19 at 283. For an insight into how thejus sanguinis andjus soli are
applied in most countries see Scott, "Nationality: JusSoli orJusSanguinis?"(1930), 24 Am. J.Int'l
L. 158 (1930). On the different ways that dual nationality may arise and its legal implications see
generally N. BarYaacov, DualNationality (1961).
23. Tung-Pi Chen, supra, note 19 at p. 286. Article 5 of the PRC 1980 Nationality Law provides:
"Any person born abroad whose parents are Chinese nationals or one of whose parents is a Chinese
national has Chinese nationality. But a person whose parents are Chinese nationals and have settled
abroad or one of whose parents is a Chinese national and has settled abroad and who has acquired
foreign nationality on birth does not have Chinese nationality."
24. See the discussion by Tung-Pi Chen, supra, note 19 at 288-290, 310-312.
25. Art. 7.
26. Art. 6.
27. British Nationality Act, 1981,29 & 30 Eliz. 2, ch. 61. The Act came into force on Jan. 1, 1983.
British Nationality Act, 1981, (Commencement Order 1982), S.I. 1982, No. 933. The legal
background of the Act and the detailed changes are the focus of Blake, "Citizenship, Law and the
State: The BritishNationality Act 1981," (1982),45 Mod. L. Rev. 179. See also White and Hampson,
"British Nationality Law -Proposed Changes", (1981), 30 Int'l and Comp. L.Q. 247 (1981); White
and Hampson, "The British Nationality Act 1981 - Civitas in Tres PartesDivisaEst," (1982) Public
Law 6.
28. Blake, supra,note 27 at 196.
29. This is the terminology used in Nottebohm (Liechtensteinv. Guatemala), 1955 I.C.J. 5.
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links lie with a dependency of the United Kingdom; these persons would
have a right of abode according to the immigration law of each dependency.30 The third category is the British Overseas Citizenship, created for
all existing citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies who do not fit
into either of the first two categories. These would be persons who, for
example, were born in a now-independent former British colony, did not
opt for the local citizenship,3 and have no right of abode anywhere.
Hong Kong residents who were formerly citizens of the United
Kingdom and Colonies (a designation replaced by the Act) became
British Dependent Territories Citizens on January 1, 1983, and thus all
Hong Kong British passport bearers received B.D.T.C. status. 32 Clearly,
the option of emigrating to the United Kingdom by B.D.T.C.s was closed.
Methods of acquisition of citizenship were also changed. Birth in the
colony, Hong Kong, confers B.D.T.C. status, but only if a parent is a
33
B.D.T.C. or settled in the colony.
The United Kingdom Memorandum specifies thatB.D.T.C. status will
lapse for all persons connected with Hong Kong on July 1, 1997, but those
persons "will be eligible to retain an appropriate status which, without
conferring the right of abode in the United Kingdom, will entitle them to
continue to use passports issued by the Government of the United
Kingdom. 34 They will become British Overseas Citizens, which cannot
be passed on byjus sanguinisbut as holders of British passports, they will
be entitled to receive, upon request, British consular services and protection when in third countries (not in Hong Kong or China). 35 Hong Kong's
immigration law is complex. 36 The Immigration Ordinance details whom
30. B.D.T.C.s had no right of abode in the United Kingdom; Lo Shiu-hing, "The Politics of
Decolonization in Hong Kong," (1989), 25 Issues and Studies 73 at p. 82.
31. See the examples of East African Asian and persons in Malaysia in White and Hampson, supra,
note 27 at p. 11.
32. British Nationality Act, 1981, supra,note 27, s.23.
33. Ibid. 55. 1(3), 15(3).
34. Para(a),supra,note 1at p. 138 1.The paragraph stipulates further"[t]his status [British Overseas
Citizens] will be acquired by such persons only if they hold or are included in such a British passport
issued before 1July 1997, except that eligible persons born on or after 1 January 1997 but before I
July 1997 may obtain or be included in such a passport up to 31 December 1997." Also, no person
born on or after July 1, 1997, that is connected with Hong Kong will acquire British Overseas
Citizenship (para. (b)). Further clarifications are found in Marston, "United Kingdom Materials on
International Law 1986" (1986), 57 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L.487 at529-532 and Marston,"UnitedKingdom
Materials on International Law 1989", (1989), 60 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 569 at 607-608.
35. The United Kingdom Memorandum also states that its consular officers in the Hong Kong SAR
and elsewhere may renew and replace passports of British Overseas Citizenship, and may issue
passports to offspring born before July 1, 1997 of persons holding British Overseas Citizenship who
were previously included in the passport of their parent: ibid., para. (c).
36. On the historical development of immigration in Hong Kong see in particular Chen, "The
Development of Immigration Law and Policy: The Hong Kong Experience" (1988), 33 McGill L.J.
632; Clarke, "Hong Kong Immigration Control: The Law and the Bureaucratic Maze" (1986), 16
Hong Kong L.J. 342.
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amongst its dwellers have the status of "Hong Kong belonger," the only
status which carries with it the right of abode in the territory. Actually, the
Hong Kong belonger status can be acquired at birth, by naturalization,
adoption, registration or marriage as set out in the provisions of the
Immigration Ordinance in tandem with the British Nationality Act 1981,
37
but the status does not inure through residence alone.
Although the Joint Declaration may serve as a workable framework for
the PRC and the United Kingdom to accomplish their own policies and
purposes, what happens to the people of Hong Kong and their prospects
for deriving the benefits of a bright future in the post-1997 years are
speculative at this time. The Joint Declaration will be fleshed out and
incorporated into the law of the Hong Kong SAR via the Basic Law38 that
was promulgated by the President of the PRC on April 4, 1990, following
its adoption by the National People's Congress. This legal framework is
to operate for a fifty year period from July 1, 1997.19 As completed, the
Basic Law sets out the governmental structure of the Hong Kong SAR
and the relationship of this autonomous region to the PRC.
Several commentators take the view that the Hong Kong legislature
will be ineffective in enactment of its own laws, as the PRC Constitution
expressly authorizes the State Council, the executive body of the National
People's Congress of the PRC, the highest organ of state power, "to annul,
or alter, any of Hong Kong's legislature enactments that conflict with the
National Constitution."4' Moreover, the Joint Declaration states that the

37. Clarke discusses the Hong Kong belonger status in detail, supra,note 36 at 342-350, as well as
the statuses.of Chinese resident, residentBritish citizen, and resident United Kingdom belonger, who
carry qualified rights to land in Hong Kong, ibid., at 350-356. See also, Chen, supra, note 36 at 644648. On the meaning of "residents and non-residents in the Hong Kong SAR" see Shuwen, "The
Basic Rights and Obligations of Residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region"
(1988), 2 J. Chinese L. 123, 126-130 (1988).
38. Joint Declaration, para. 3, and Annex I, arts. 1 and 2. The initial draft of the Basic Law was
published in April 1988; text of this draft has been reprinted in (1988) 20 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 301
(1988). Some oftheproblems of this draft are discussed by Lau, "Structure oftheHongKong Special
Administrative Region Government," (1988), 20 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 51.
The complete text of both the first and second drafts of the Basic Law are reprinted in (Fall 1989),
22 Chinese L. & Gov't, 12, 196.
A multitude of issues and problems concerning the drafting of the Basic Law are examined in a
number of scholarly works presented in a Symposium on the Hong Kong Basic Law, (1988), 2 J.
Chinese L. 1-151.
For an introductory note, see C. Ku, Basic Law Drafting Background as promulgated on April 4,
1990, and the adopted Basic Law itself are found in (1990), 29 Int'l Leg. Mat. 1511.
39. Joint Declaration, para. 3(12).
40. Shiu, "Recent Development, Hong Kong: Prospects of Autonomy under Chinese Rule after
1997" (1990), 3 Transnat'l Law 141 at 163. Reference is to art. 85 of the PRC Constitution which
states "Itihe State Council, that is, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of
China, is the executive body of the [National Congress,] the highest organ of state power, it is the
highest organ of state administration.": ibid., at 163, n. 191. Mushkat, supra,note 2 at 180-181.
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Hong Kong SAR will be constituted in accordance with the provisions of
Article 31 of the PRC Constitution. 4' The second draft of the Basic Law,
published in February 1989, continued to leave potential problems
between its provisions and the Joint Declaration unresolved.4'
The Pro-DemocracyMovement and TiananmenMassacre of 1989
In the Spring of 1989, the interplay of many social, economic, and
political factors collectively spawned the so-called pro-democracy movement. Supported initially by several thousand Beijing University students, the movement rapidly attracted over a million followers and
developed into a nationwide mass movement.4 Despite this serious threat
to the Chinese Communist Party, the PRC Government exercised relative
restraint in confronting the massive demonstrations until some two weeks
after President Gorbachev's visit to the PRC. The PRC Government had
branded the pro-democracy movement as a"counter-revolutionary rebellion". A build up of positive expectations in Beijing and other major cities
of the PRC was quickly reversed in the Chinese Army's great massacre
of Tiananmen Square that ominously began at 2 a.m. on June 4th. The
brutal crackdown and the ensuing political oppression aroused worldwide repercussions including immediate economic sanctions against the

41. Joint Declaration, para. 3(1). One commentator points out that it appears unresolved "whether
the entire Constitution of the PRC becomes applicable to any special administrative region created
under article 31," Bowie, "The Effect of the Tiananmen Square Massacre Upon Negotiations for the
Draft Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region," (1990), 8 Dick J. Int'l L. 245
at 253-54 (1990). Also of relevance is Cheng, 'The Constitutional Relationship Between The Central
Government and the Future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government" (1988), 20
Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 65 (1988).
Article 31 of the PRC Constitution provides that "[t]he state may establish special administrative
regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be
prescribed by law enacted by the NPC in the light of the special conditions": ibid., at 66.
42. See Chen, "Hong Kong: China's June 4 Massacre, Emigration and Capital Flight", (1989), 3
Geo. Immigr. L. J. 293 at 297-299.
43. The background of the factors and events leading up to the massacre of June 4, 1989, are ably
discussed in Chu-yuan Cheng, Behind The Tiananmen Massacre (1990), at 122-136; a helpful
chronology of important events during the period April 15-July 15, 1989, is found ibid.at 201. See
also the Statements of AmbassadorR. W. Williams, Pei Minxin &H. Harding on the topic The Wave
Of ProtestIn The People'sRepublic Of China,HearingBefore The Subcomm. on Asian & Pacific
Affairs, Comm. on ForeignAffairs, U.S. H.R., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. May 4, 1989 (1990).
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Beijing regime. 4 Although certain of the measures were symbolic and
transitory, the force used against unarmed people left an indelible image.
Beijing's military repression of the pro-democracy movement abruptly
weakened the confidence of the people in Hong Kong as to whether the
PRC would abide by its commitments in the Joint Declaration. Not
surprisingly, a new wave of capital flight 5 and emigration 6 began. In the
aftermath, it was reported that the best educated individuals, including
managers, professionals, secretaries and technicians were lining up in
record crowds in Hong Kong at the American, Australian and Canadian
consulates seeking visas. One day saw 1700 Chinese at the Australian
Consulate as compared with an average of 120 a day.47 Despite Hong
44. Ibid. pp. 146-163. With regard to the United States, for example, although President Bush
extended most-favored-nation trading status to the PRC for anotheryear at the end of May, 25 Weekly
Comp.Pres.Doc. 832 (May 31, 1989), on June 5th he ordered "[s]uspension of all government-togovernment sales and commercial exports of weapons, suspension of visits between U.S. and
Chinese military leaders, sympathetic review of requests by Chinese students in the United States to
extend their stay and the offer ofhumanitarian and medical assistance through the Red Cross to those
injured during the assault, and review of other aspects ofour bilateral relationship as events in China
continue to unfold": ibid.at p. 839 (June 5, 1989). Subsequent measures to allow Chinese students
to remain in the United States, and subsequent congressional and presidential responses to assist
these students is reported by Birnbaum, "Immigration Law: The United States Waives Visa
Requirements For Chinese Nationals - Memorandum of Disapproval for the Emergency Chinese
Immigration Relief Act of 1989", (Nov. 30,1989) 25 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc.1853, (1990), 31
Harvard Int'l L.. 625. As to the harsh measures instituted by the PRC Government in the immediate
days after the massacre and an assessment of the Bush sanctions see Human Rights And Political
Developments In China,HearingsBefore The Subcommittees On Human Rights And International
Organizations,On Asian And Pacific Affairs, And On Int'l EconomicPolicyAnd Trade, Comm. On
ForeignAffairs, U.S., H. R. 101st. Cong. 1st. Sess. July 13 & 19, 1989 (1990). [hereinafter cited as
Hearings]
On April 11, 1990, President Bush directed the Attomey-General of the U.S. to defer to Jan. 1, 1994
enforced departure of nationals of the PRC and their dependents who were in the United States on
or afterJune 5,1989; 26 Weekly Comp. Pres.Doc. 558 (April 16,1990). See also Waller & Hoffman,
"United States Immigration Law As A Foreign Policy Tool: The Beijing Crisis And The United
States Response" (1989) 3 Geo. Immigr. L. J. 313.
45. See Wu & Jao, "The Economic Consequences of 1997, (1988), 20 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 17
(1988); Shiu, "Hong Kong: Prospects of Autonomy under Chinese Rule after 1997" (1990), 3
Transnat'l Law. 141, at 166-167; Chen, supra,note 42 at 299-311. The amount of Capital flight by
the Chinese wealthy class has been placed at $5 billion yearly: Cheng, supra,note 43, at 166. For a
positive view against future outflow of capital, before the Tiananmen massacre see Cheng, "An
Economic Analysis of Capital Flight in Hong Kong" (1985), 17 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 683.
46. Emigration from Hong Kong in 1983 was 19,800. During 1984 and 1985 the level was about
22,400. After a slight decline in 1986 to 19,800, it rose to 30,000 in 1987 and to 45,800 in 1988,
approximately 90% going to Australia (nearly 8,000), Canada (24,588) and the United States (nearly
12,000); The PoliticalSituation In Hong Kong And Issues Relating To Emigration,HearingAnd
MarkupBefore The Subcommittee on Asian & PacificAffairs,Comm. on ForeignAffairs, U.S., H.R.
101st Cong., 1st Sess. Oct. 25, 1989, pp. 6-7, 14 (1990). For a brief assessment of United States,
Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, Singapore and United Kingdom attitudes and projections
concerning future emigration from Hong Kong see ibid., at 27-35.
47. See Butterfield, "Hong Kong Fears China's Hard Line" N.Y. Times, June 8, 1989, p. 8. It was
also reported that applications were up 50% at the Jamaica Consulate inHong Kong as an immigrant
can become a permanent resident of Jamaica for an investment of $100,000.
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Kong's leaders' request to the United Kingdom Government for a right
of abode in that country as a practical reassurance against PRC mistreatment after 1997, it was not in the offing.48
After months of speculation the United Kingdom announced in late
December 1989, that it would grant full British passports and British
citizenship to 50,000 families in Hong Kong, giving as many as 225,000
people, out of 3.25 million holders of the current special British passports,
the right to settle in the United Kingdom.4 9The PRC reaction was to brand
the United Kingdom's decision as a violation of the Joint Declaration. At
the year's end, it was calculated that about 42,000 Hong Kong residents
had emigrated during the year." Meanwhile, the final drafting of the
Basic Law for the Hong Kong SAR stirred deep dissatisfaction from the
United Kingdom and Hong Kong spokespersons.5 1 Beijing announced
that it would not recognize foreign passports held by Hong Kong Chinese
after 1997, and thereby directly undermined the United Kingdom's plan
to give its full citizenship to the 50,000 Hong Kong families, enabling
52
them to remain in Hong Kong with an escape voucher in their pockets.
Given the doubts as to their future if they remained, emigration from the
colony was averaging about 1,000 persons a week, 53 and investment
continued to flow outward.54
48. See Butterfield, "British Secretary Is Booed By Angry Crowd in Hong Kong,"New YorkTimes, July
3,1989, p. 5; Basler, "Hong Kong Hears Disquieting News,"New York Times, July 4, 1989, p. 4 .
49. See Basler, "Fight in Hong Kong for Rights as Britons," N.Y. Times, Dec. 21,1989, p. 3; Prokesch,
"225,000 In Colony To Become British,"N.Y. Times, Dec. 21,1989, p. 3. On April 19,1990, the House
of Commons passed the bill to offer refuge to the 50,000 families;
see Rule, "Britain Will Offer Refuge to
50,000 Successful Hong Kong Families," N.Y. Times, April 20,1990, p. A3.
For more details on the debate concerning the right of abode in the United Kingdom see Note, "Great
Britain'sNewHongKongImmigrationPolicy: The Solution To HongKong's Emigration Crisis?" (1990),
4Geo.Inmigr.LJ. 145,148-150. Also, on the selection process to beused see Onslow-Cole, "Hong Kong
Blues," (April 27,1990), 140JNew L.J. 584; British Information Service, 20SurveyofCurrentAffairsNo.
5, 170 (May 1990).
50. Erlanger, "China Condemns British Decision To Take InHong Kong Families,"N.Y. Times, Dec. 3 1,
1989, p. 4; British Information Service, 20 Survey of CurrentAffairs, No. 1, at 15-16 (Jan. 1990). The
decision of the United Kingdom was not met with much enthusiasm in its Parliament; see Whitney, "Big
British Fight Shapes Up On Hong Kong Emigre-Plan," N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1990, p. 1.
51. SeeBasler, "BritonEndingHongKongVisit PledgesDemocraticChangesSooenN.Y.TimesJan. 17,
1990, p. 8; Basler, "Draft Law for Chinese Stirs Protest in Hong Kong," N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1990, p. 3;
Kristof, "Subjugating Hong Kong,"N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1990, p. 12.
52. SeeKristof, "HongKongWamedonPassportPan"N.Y.TimesMar.2, 1990, p. 8; MacFarquhar, "In
Hong Kong, the future is now," US. New & World Report,Mar. 19,1990, p. 22. Passage of the British
Nationality(HongKong)Actofl990onJuly23 whichgaveU.citizensiptothe50,000familiesbrought
furtherBeijing rebuke in July: see "ChinaAttacks Britain's Plan ForPassports in HongKong",N.Y. Times,
July 29, 1990, p. 8.
53. See Prokesch, "Few Willing to Help Britain Help Hong Kong Enigrants"N.Y. Times, Mar. 6,1990,
p. 9A. Monied families were sending pregnant women to Western countries to give their babies on birth,
foreign citizenship and a foreign passport. See Kristof, "Hong Kong's Desperation Over '97 Can Be
Measured in Foreign Passports," N.Y. Times, May 16, 1990, p. A7. Basler, "Hong Kong Increases
Emigration Estimate,"N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1990, p. 5.
54. Sanger, "As Hong Kong's Elite Leave, Investors From Japan Arrive",N.Y. Times, May 29,1990, P.
Ai.
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Before the end of 1990, the United States passed legislation which,
amongst other things, considered Hong Kong as a foreign state for the
purposes of immigration quotas. In each of the next three years the annual
quota was doubled from 5,000 to 10,000 persons. Hong Kong was to be
treated as a foreign state after 1997, for immigration purposes. In
addition, 12,000 visas above the annual quota in each of the next three
years were available to employees of U.S. businesses operating in Hong
Kong, and certain of their dependents. Also, special immigrant status was
made available for foreign service nationals at the United States Consulate in Hong Kong who were in service for at least three years, and their
immediate family members. Finally, and most importantly, the successful visa applicants could use their visa at any time until January 1, 2002.11
Other developments in Hong Kong towards the end of 1990 also
showed the Hong Kong people that Beijing was prematurely interfering
6
with their future prosperity.
Most recently was the passing of the deadline set by the United
Kingdom for applications requesting British passports with a right to
reside in the United Kingdom. This first phase, offering 50,000 heads of
households to apply for 43,500 places brought only 65,674 applications,
a considerable shortfall from the 300,000 applications expected. Perhaps
it was the 32-page application form with its 250-page instruction manual
which many felt was daunting,57or perhaps Australia, Canada and United
States offered greater prospects.
The PotentialRefugees of Hong Kong SAR
Today, Hong Kong has apopulation of approximately 5.7 million persons
of whom there are some 3.25 million Chinese. Although Hong Kong has
had a Chinese refugee problem in the past58 and a present refugee
problem 9 of considerable magnitude it is the potential refugee 6 problem

55. Immigration Act of 1990, P.L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 1978, ss. 103, 124, 152, 154 (Nov. 29,
1990). The legislative history of the Act discloses thatAmerican investment in HongKong was over
$6 billion. More than 900 American firms were doing business in Hong Kong, employing
approximately 200,000 Hong Kong nationals. It was estimated that those firms lost 24% of their key
employees in the previous year as a result of emigration and transfers to non-U.S. businesses who
offered these highly skilled employees immigration benefits as a prerequisite condition of employment: U.S.C.C. & AN. LegislativeHistory Section, p. 4 7 (Jan. 1991).
56. Beijing officials objected to Hong Kong's plans to build a new $16.3 billion airport and
expanded shipping port. See Kristof, "'Meddling' by Chinese Is Worrying Hong Kong,"N.Y. Times,
Dec. 28, 1990, p. A2; Basler, "Furor Erupts Over Hong Kong Plan," N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1990, p.
A3.
57. See, "How China votes" (March 9, 1991), The Economist.33; Basler, "Few in Hong Kong Ask
to be British," N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1991, p. A3.
58. See E. Hambro, The Problem of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong (1955).
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that could occur once the PRC resumes its sovereignty over the Hong
Kong SAR that is being considered. Thusfar, I have only accounted for
those Hong Kong belongers who have sought to emigrate legally or who
have secured the necessary documentation to emigrate but have not yet
actually left or who are eligible to emigrate but have not yet applied to the
potential host countries. The numbers of these people are still in the tens
of thousands. Of course there is the potential of a massive flow of refugees
from the Hong Kong SAR in the hundreds of thousands if not millions.
There is the recognized fundamental human right of freedom of
movement. The International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights,
1966, provides that "everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own."'61Neither the International Covenant nor other human rights
instruments which contain a similar provision restricts freedom of
movement to travel internationally so as to exclude the right to emigrate.
There is an important caveat to freedom of emigration and that is to have
a willing, receiving host state. Thus, a voluntary massive movement of
people would require states to take not only the brain drain segment of
Hong Kong society, but those less endowed by ability, education,
financial resources or position.
Along with the traditional matters undertaken by the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), (the
principal United Nations agency concerned with refugees), those of

59. A recent book dealing with the refugee problems following the American withdrawal from
Vietnam and the subsequent political upleavals in Laos and Cambodia is V.0. Sutter, The
IndochineseRefigee Dilemma (1990). Specifically with respect to Kong Kong, arrivals began to
outstrip resettlement since 1986 and on June 16, 1988, Hong Kong initiated a screening process so
that the authorities could cope with the number of arrivals. See Hanson, "Hong Kong's Screen Door
Policy: An Analysis Of Hong Kong's Screening Procedures In The Context of International Law"
(1990), 16 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 583; Helton, "The Comprehensive Plan Of Action For Indo-Chinese
Refugees: An Experiment In Refugee Protection And Control" (1990), 8 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts.
111,114-115,132-138,143-144. As tothe overall Hong Kong refugeepolicy seeMushkat, "Refugee
in Hong Kong" (1989), 1 Int'l J. Refugee L. 449.
60. There is a considerable literature on the various aspects involving refugees. A good starting point
is G.S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee InInternationalLaw(1983) and the selectbibliography included
(1990), along
in the book, and G. Loescher&L. Monahan, eds.,RefugeesandlnternationalRelations
with the Refugee Reference Guide and Selected Reading at 410 ff., together with some major
bibliographical references pertaining to refugees at 4. n. 1.
61. Article 12(2). Article 12(3) provides: "[tihe above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any
restrictions except those which are provided bylaw, are necessary to protect national security, public
order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent
with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant." 999 U.N. Treaty Series 171. Article XIII
of Annex I of the Joint Declaration stipulates that "[t]he Provisions of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Scial and Cultural Rights as
applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force." The PRC is not party to either International Covenant.
Some interesting queries arise if the PRC were to become aparty to these treaties: see Hannum, supra,
note 10 at p. 144.
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humanitarian protection and relief, repatriation, integration into the state
of first asylum and resettlement in third states, a new dimension has been
added. Since the early 1980's there has been a focus and concern directed
towards the prevention of refugee situations from arising. Initiatives
taken at the United Nations62 to avert new flows of refugees have
produced two reports63 but not much more sufficient progress so as to
alleviate the current refugee situations that have arisen in consequence of
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the Iraqi Kurds and Iraqi Shiite
Muslims of 1991.
The factors contributing to a potential mass exodus from Hong Kong
are at present ideological, political and socio-economic. Any observers
of an early warning system can merely examine the Joint Declaration to
see what is to be preserved and protected in the Hong Kong SAR and
compare those concepts and institutions with their counterparts in the
PRC. A reading of U.S. or Canadian 'national' newspapers over the last
several years leads one to say that there is regional discontent, socioeconomic disparity, cultural separatism, political repression, economic
deprivation, incompetent government, and widespread human rights
violations in the PRC.
At times the international community may not become aware of the
internal causes which bring about a refugee flow until the eruption is
ignited. Premature preventative measures taken by the international
community could be characterized as an interference into the domestic
affairs of the country of origin. In the case of the PRC, countries such as
the United States watched for the PRC Government to show some
positive signs in resolving the problems that set aflame the pro-democracy movement. Although Beijing's human rights performance was
found to be unacceptable a year after the Tiananmen Square massacre, 64

62. The most complete legal analysis of these initiatives, the problems associated with their
realization and useful suggestions on progress in this direction is found in Lee, "Toward A World
Without Refugees: The United Nations Group of Governmental Experts On International Cooperation To Avert New Flows Of Refugees," (1986), 57 British Y. B. Int'l L. 317. See also Garvey,
"Toward aReformulation of International Refugee Law," (1985), 26 Harvard Int'l L.J 483,492-499;
Martin, "Large-Scale Migrations Of Asylum Seekers" (1982), 76 .Am. J. Int'l. L. 598. Coles,
"Approaching the Refugee Problem Today" in Refutgees andInternationalRelations,
supra,note 60,
373, at 390-404; Lee, "The UN Group of Governmental Experts On International Co-operation to
Avert New Flows of Refugees" (1984), 78 Am. J.Int'l L. 480.
63. Sadruddin Aga Khan, Study on Human Rights and Massive Exoduses, UN Doc. EICN. 4/1503
(198 1);Reportofthe UnitedNationsGroup ofGovernmentalExpertson InternationalCo-operation
to Avert New Flows of Refugees, UN Doc. A/41/324 (13 May 1986).
64. See Sino-American Relations: One Year After The Massacre At Tiananmen Square, Hearing
Before TheSubcomm. onEastAsian& PacificAffairs,Comm. on ForeignRelations,U.S., Sen. 101st
Cong. 2nd Sess. June 6, 1990 (1991). An insightful analysis is also discussed in Dehai, "China
Democracy Movement And Legal Crisis" (1990), 8 U.C.L.A. Pac Basin L.J. 390 (1990).
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the United States renewed China's most-favored-nation trading status65
for another year as being in the best interests for the United States and for
the Chinese people. For the year, the United States found "China's human
rights climate in 1990 remained repressive, if less overtly so than in 1989
...At least several hundred persons remained detained without formal
charge since the 1989 crackdown on political dissent. ' 66 One needs only
to compare the human rights records67 of Hong Kong with that of the PRC
to recognize why the people of Hong Kong question PRC integrity
towards them after 1997.
At this time, it can be said that the PRC is not intentionally creating the
root causes of a potential mass exodus from Hong Kong. Its own
problems run deep." There is no forced emigration as a government
policy. It wants to receive Hong Kong back as a continuing thriving
financial and economic centre. But its own political social, economic and
legal systems are different. There are enough current differences and
incompatibilities between Hong Kong and the PRC to give anyone cause
for concern aside from the disruption of confidence brought about by
Tiananmen Square action of June 1989.
Government officials for the United Kingdom and the PRC continue
to consult bilaterally69 on matters relating to the future of Hong Kong, but
other mechanisms should be developed before 1997.
Mechanisms required to monitor root causes of potential refugee flows
due to man-created situations, as distinguished from natural disasters
may evoke a negative response from any state targeted. There are of
course the political sensitivities of the State being watched. Although
human rights transgressions may well be some of the root causes, they
65. 26 Weekly Comp. Pres.Doc. 827 (May 24, 1990). It was reported that approximately 17,000
Chinese nationals emigrated from the PRC to the U.S. in 1989. It was further stated that "[n]ot to
continue MFN for China would deliver aterrible blow to Hong Kong, costing as many as 20,000jobs
and reducing the colony's GNP by as much as 2.5 percent. Hong Kong should not be the innocent
victim of our disappointment with the Chinese administration": p. 828.
The U.S. Senate was made specifically aware of the confidence crisis in Hong Kong at this time and
what were considered to be violations of the Joint Declaration by the recent enactment of the Basic
Law; see Lee, "Hong Kong: Denial ofDemocracy and Human Rights Before and After 1997," supra
Hearing,note 64, at 221-225.
66. Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1990, Report submitted to the Comm. on
ForeignRelations and the Comm. on ForeignAffairs, U.S., H.R. by the Dept. of State, 102d Cong.
1st. Sess. p. 845 (Feb. 1991).
67. See the reports on Hong Kong and PRC, ibid. at 1333-1341 and 845-866, respectively.
Generally, this type of national monitoring by the U.S. and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations have really brought the changes beneficial to the best interests of the people of the
monitored country.
68. See Cheng, supra,note 43, at 13-66, and Hager, "Roots Of Dissent And Repression In Deng's
China," (1990), 8 U.C.L.A. Pac. Basin L. J. 197.
69. See Kristof, "Briton and Chinese Still Split On Hong Kong Airport Plan," N.Y. Times, April 7,
1991, p. 10.
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may also be only a part of greater complexities. Linkage of human rights
groups and humanitarian aid entities operating closely with government
decision-makers have been proposed, 70 but as that focus has been to try
and deal with all future possible mass exoduses, perhaps the Hong KongUnited Kingdom-PRC known situation can be dealt with independently.
A Stop-Gap Suggestion
What is suggested is not a prototype, as the establishment of an effective
machinery requires in depth studies of alternatives representing the great
diversity of conditions existing in the world's community of nations. A
durable pragmatic design of approaches should be the objective to take into
consideration the various regional differences that exist and circumstances
thatmay be peculiar to particular groups of states. The ultimate breakthrough
would be the development of a code of conduct and procedures that States
would voluntarily want to adopt so as to recognize root causes and resolve
them before any social unrest threatens the government's continued existence orinternationalposture, and the outpouring of humanity across national
boundaries. At thisjuncture, given the time for transition and 1997 still being
some years away, it is recommended that the good offices7 of the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations be considered. The Secretary-General could
create an ad hoc group of advisors, who would be ideologically neutral, to
investigate avenues of dealing with and analyzing the information which
they find, and work with the particular government representatives appointed by each of the Parties. They could report to the Secretry-General
directly or be authorized to offer recommendations to both Governments.
To avert a potential massive outflow in the future and the continued
emigration that currently exists, the people of Hong Kong need some
positive signs from the PRC and the United Kingdom. It is not apanacea, but
a new road72 of international cooperation may give Hong Kong's people
nascent hope that they deserve.
70. Beyer, "Monitoring Root Causes of Refugee Flows and Early Warning: The Need for Substance," (Special Issue, Sept. 1990), Int'l J. Refugee L. 71 at p. 82.
71. The Office ofthe UN Secretary-General is suggested because ofthe widening roleplayed by this
individual and the Office in maintaining international peace.and security. In this regard see
Bourloyannis, "Fact-Finding By The Secretary-General ofThe UnitedNations," (1990), 22 N.Y.U.J.
Int'l L. & Pol. 641; Franck, "The Role and Future Prospects of The Secretary-General", in D.
Bardonnet, ed., The Adaptation OfStructures And Methods At The United Nations 81 (1986).
A recent seminar entitled "Towards Practical Early Warning Capabilities," sponsored by The Centre
for Refugee Studies, York University, Toronto, May 29-31, 1991, is pertinent in this regard. Of
particular interest is the paper presented by T. Kanninen, "Review of Existing And Planned
Monitoring And Information Activities Relevant To Early Warning Systems Concerning Refugees
And Displaced Persons" (mimeo).
72. Statements like those made on April 9 at a news conference by Prime Minister Li Peng of the
PRC, to mark the end of the 1991 session of the National People's Congress, that Beijing was ready
to use force again to suppress dissent, are not likely to quell anxiety in Hong Kong. See Kristof,
"Chinese Premier Defends '89 Crackdown on Protestors," N.Y. Times, April 10, 1991, p. A3.

